The Sub Burndown

Saturday December 26, 2015



Section 1
- The Sub Fire -


6 Minutes With The Arsonist
Incendiary #1 — The timeline of initial events that sparked suspicion of arson.
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Fire Investigation Never Done
Cover-up of The Sub Fire started two days later…
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SLO City FD Failure to Evacuate
Clearing the building and ensuring nobody is inside - a crucial step neglected by the SLO City FD.
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No R.I.T. or F.A.S.T Crew Assigned
BC-1 Berryman not only did not assign a R.I.T./F.A.S.T. crew, he put his command post where the fire did eventually burn to…
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The Sub Fire Load & Interior Details
Store inventory and layout tells a different tale...
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Sub Roof Details
The Sub and SDRS had a complete recent earthquake upgrade...to achieve a one-hour Class A roof fire rating.
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Seven Paths To Enter & Fight The Fire At The Sub
The Sub was unique in how many ways it would have been easy to fight a fire.
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Burning A Building Down Is Not Firefighting
You can't put a structure fire out with chainsaws.
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Unknown Incendiary Device #2
Our assertion is that all evidence points to UID #2, having been ignited on top of The Sub.
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See How the Fire Moved Through the Structures



Total Destruction

Total Destruction: A Job Well Done for SLO City FD?

Total destruction was considered a job well done by SLO City Fire leadership because no fireman was injured.

With this as their only standard of success, it is easy to see why SLOFD no longer actually fights significant fires.

SLO City FD Battalion Chief (BC-1) Neal A. Berryman, who personally directed the burndown said to The Sub owner (12 minutes into the fire), "We will take NO risk to save your property."

If SLOFD leadership had stopped at taking no risk and just let The Sub burn, Square Deal Recordings & Supplies would have not caught fire

If only SLOFD had not responded, only The Sub would have burned and 3.5 million gallons of water would have been saved.

Without the aggressive vent cutting ahead of the fire, and the air blown in (via fire hoses) through the multiple draft holes cut into the roof as well as through the front door, the fire could not have burned as hot or intensely and would have moved much slower. It took deliberate and intentional effort to spread and intensify the fire to burn so quickly and completely from just a window box fire – which was burning only 24" into one part of one building. The fire would not have had the intensity to burn through the wall into Square Deal and would have stayed in The Sub. It would also have allowed firefighters ample time to do their job of saving Square Deal rather than destroying it.

The roof parapet walls held the fire in The Sub. The SLOFD leadership's actions are what forced it into Square Deal by burning through the back wall with all the air they drove in, as the hose pointed only to the left of The Sub's front door.

Unless there is civilian oversight and performance standards that serve the community (rather than just SLOFD), SLOFD will clearly be more of a hazard to property owners (in case of a fire) than an asset.

SLOFD's current leadership replaces leadership that would allow the real firefighters to do their job and be the heroes we all think they are.

Until the current leadership is replaced, we will all face more danger and property destruction than we should.



View to the left of The Sub's front door where BC-1 Berryman put water to add air to the roof burning above. NOTE: The merchandise and fixtures were not on fire, only the roof.

Section 2
- Square Deal Recordings & Supplies (SDRS) Fire -


The Sub Office Fire Proves Fire Did Not Come into Front of SDRS from The Sub through the Firewall Between the Two Businesses

The Sub/ SDRS Corp.© stands to prove the fire did not come into front of SDRS through the firewall of The Sub
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Unknown Incendiary Device #3 in SDRS

How did the fire go from The Sub to the front of Square Deal Recordings & Supplies when the fire was out in the portion of The Sub adjoining the front of Square Deal before the fire started in the front of Square Deal?
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SDRS Fire Load Notes

The SLO City FD leadership has repeatedly stated we had a huge fire load at Square Deal Recordings & Supplies. This is relatively untrue and totally untrue from the perspective of the two hours they had to stop the fire that was not yet in our building or prevent it from entering Square Deal.
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11 Basic Stop Points for Preventing Fire Spread into SDRS from Rear

11 basic stop points for preventing fire spread into Square Deal Recordings & Supplies from the rear (Pismo Street)
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Hole Map Illustration

Holes cut by members of SLO City FD and incendiary devices placed by unknown person(s)
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Section 3
- San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) Issues -


SLOCF Fire Calls 2009-2016
History of success rate in San Luis Obispo fires.
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SLOCF Press Release Corrections
These are what we believe to be factual corrections to SLOCF Chief Garret Olson's press release…
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Bravest Act or a Cowardly, Evil Act?
Cutting holes in roofs is something firemen do but most civilians can't tell...
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Is BC-1 Berryman an Arsonist?
In evaluating the actions of Berryman, we have come to the following realizations...
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Total Destruction is a Job Well Done
Total destruction considered a job well done because no fireman was injured.
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SLOCF Fails to Follow Own Rules
We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then what SLOCF actually did.
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SLOCF Underground "Burndown" Policy
SLOCF leadership seems to have an underground policy of refusing to go into buildings that are on fire.
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Is SLOCF Corrupt?
While none of these indicators singularly means corruption, a Fire Department guilty of most of these practices is certainly suspect, if not corrupt.
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How Can You Believe…?
Fire departments who fight few fires do not easily gain experience... There are three ways to deal with this…
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NEXT STORY

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SLO City FD Fails To Follow Their Own Rules

The following notations and comments are to point out the portions of San Luis Obispo City Fire – Emergency Operations Manual that San Luis Obispo City Fire Department (SLO City FD) did NOT follow at The Sub and Square Deal Recordings & Supplies fire, and does not follow at most fires. Failure to follow their own official written guidelines, policies, and procedures resulted in the total destruction of two San Luis Obispo businesses that had both been in the community 44+ years, and the total destruction of every property with a serious fire at least the last ten years.

We will state the appropriate rule from the current SLOCF manual and then, indicated by arrow and italicized copy:

What SLO City FD actually did.

The decision to refuse to fight a fire is a huge, serious, and significant decision. Nowhere in any firefighter narratives on this fire is there any discussion or consideration of what they are intending to do and the effects it will have on the business, the employees, the family operating the business, the community downwind who had to eat all the smoke needlessly generated, and the millions of gallons of water wasted. If only Incident Commander BC-1 Neal Berryman or Fire Chief Garret Olson would have considered fighting the fire (instead of only considering a quick burndown in the name of firefighter safety but at the expense of everyone else and the community), it would have been a small short fire. By refusing to fight the fire when they could and should have, they abandoned their responsibilities to the community and chose only to serve themselves. They not only chose not to do their job, they did worse than nothing – They intentionally helped spread and intensify the fire. SLO City FD leadership is responsible for most of the destruction in The Sub and ALL of the Square Deal destruction that followed.

SAN LUIS OBISPO CITY FIRE - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANUAL - (EXCERPTS)

SLOCF - E.O. 501.00
INCIDENT COMMAND

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

• "The IC will then establish command and identity/name of an incident, and take an effective command position."

The fire was not in view from the command position. BC-1 Berryman failed to take effective command position as he could not see the fire from his command position.

• "The IC shall perform a size-up/risk assessment, determine the incident objectives, and communicate them to all participants."

No size-up/risk assessment was done. BC-1 Berryman had a predetermined agenda stemming from either his own preferences or underground (or unpublished) firefighter policies that SLO City FD is operating with. BC-1 Berryman makes no mention of any risk actual assessments in his narrative. He tells the business owner he will take ZERO risk just over 12 minutes into the fire.

Failed completely in sizing up the incident. BC-1 Berryman sent firemen onto the roof before even looking at the fire. BC-1 Berryman does not comment anywhere in his narrative on the continuous and ongoing sizing-up of the situation he is supposed to be doing in determining the actions he should be taking.

• "The IC shall be responsible to continually evaluate the progress toward accomplishing incident objectives and/or adjust them as necessary."

Actually fighting the fire was never evaluated or considered – No R.I.C./F.A.S.T. personnel were assigned to allow possible entry to fight the fire. The only re-evaluation was how to accelerate progress of burning the structure down. Nowhere in BC-1 Berryman's narrative does he claim he constantly or repeatedly re-evaluated the fire – Nowhere does he show any concern to actually put water on the fire or stop the fire's progress. All his actions do the opposite.

• "The IC shall be responsible to continually evaluate the progress toward accomplishing incident objectives and/or adjust them as necessary."

Actually fighting the fire was never evaluated or considered – No R.I.C./F.A.S.T. personnel were assigned to allow possible entry to fight the fire. The only re-evaluation was how to accelerate progress of burning the structure down by cutting large holes ahead of the fire. BC-1 Berryman does send the chainsaw crew to the roof four times to cut additional holes without interior operations. Nowhere in BC-1 Berryman's narrative does he claim he constantly or repeatedly re-evaluated the fire – Nowhere does he show any concern to actually put water on the fire or stop the fire's progress. All his actions do the opposite.

•The IC shall be responsible for proper organization and documentation of the incident, and to utilize an Incident Action Plan (IAP) to assist in management of the incident.

BC-1 Berryman's narrative is totally insufficient and lacking in detail. Very little documentation is done. He does not take initial responsibility nor give reason for the defensive posture from the start. He leaves out completely the firefighting from 1:00pm until 11:00pm. It is as if there was no Square Deal fire…


Section 4
- Comments, Observations and Correction on Narratives by SLO City FD -


Preamble to Narratives
The overall situation with the SLOCF narratives is that they seem to be an attempt to cover up gross negligence, professional malfeasance, and cowardice…
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SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Battalion Chief-A Neal Berryman
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SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Deputy Chief Jeff Gater
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SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Chief Garret Olson
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SLOCF Captain Michael King
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Michael King
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SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Mark Vasquez
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SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain Matt Callahan
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SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
Comments, Observations, & Corrections on Narrative by SLOCF Captain-Paramedic Station 3A David Marshall
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